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Mills plug No5
- Thread starter Red line
- Start date
FWIW - in late 1916 there was a serious problem of over-supply of No.5 grenade.
In July 1916 the War Office, against Ministry of Munitions advice, asked for Mills grenade output to be increased to one million per week, and a stockpile of 4 million grenades to be built up. However, the average weekly rate of issue/expenditure was only around 400,000, and the stockpile was achieved around November.
A significant storage problem loomed, especially as the stockpile kept growing and was estimated to reach over 6,500,000 in early 1917. One solution taken by Trench Warfare Supply Department, which recognized the problem as far back as September 1916, was to persuade some manufacturers to reduce production, and a number of companies - especially ones having difficulty making the grenades - took this option. Surplus components, which would have included already marked-up base plugs, would no doubt have been sold to other companies. From the examples shown, James Cycle Co. and Vickery's Patents Ltd appear to be two such companies.
Actually Vickery's found making the Mills (No.5 and No.23 MkII) grenade such an unpleasant experience that in early 1917 they asked the Ministry to be relieved of further Mills grenade manufacture; the Ministry agreed.
Tom.
In July 1916 the War Office, against Ministry of Munitions advice, asked for Mills grenade output to be increased to one million per week, and a stockpile of 4 million grenades to be built up. However, the average weekly rate of issue/expenditure was only around 400,000, and the stockpile was achieved around November.
A significant storage problem loomed, especially as the stockpile kept growing and was estimated to reach over 6,500,000 in early 1917. One solution taken by Trench Warfare Supply Department, which recognized the problem as far back as September 1916, was to persuade some manufacturers to reduce production, and a number of companies - especially ones having difficulty making the grenades - took this option. Surplus components, which would have included already marked-up base plugs, would no doubt have been sold to other companies. From the examples shown, James Cycle Co. and Vickery's Patents Ltd appear to be two such companies.
Actually Vickery's found making the Mills (No.5 and No.23 MkII) grenade such an unpleasant experience that in early 1917 they asked the Ministry to be relieved of further Mills grenade manufacture; the Ministry agreed.
Tom.
Working from memory I was mistaken on the figures. Checking the documents, the actual anticipated excess - beyond the required 4 million stockpile - was 6.6 million by March 1917, meaning that storage had to be found in the UK for 10.6 million Mills grenades. It was this that caused the Ministry a headache. At the beginning of 1917 wholesale reduction of contracts by 50% had to be implemented, beyond any voluntary reductions already agreed in the previous autumn.
According to Frederick Vickery's own testimony after the war, his company was relieved of its production contract at the beginning of 1917, but continued to make some No.23 MkII until May.
Tom.
According to Frederick Vickery's own testimony after the war, his company was relieved of its production contract at the beginning of 1917, but continued to make some No.23 MkII until May.
Tom.
John,
I've not encountered a documented storage life for Mills grenades, and no doubt it was envisaged that they would be used before any deterioration set in. There are, however, plenty of documents that mention problems with Mills grenades and Nos 23 MkIII and 36 grenades that have been condemned at the Front or in Lines of Communication for various reasons. As late as October 1918 there is a Trench Warfare committee minute concerning possible replacement for the No.36 that includes: "It is understood that there is a very considerable wastage with the present Service grenades (i.e. the No.36), particularly in winter time, as it is difficult to keep them from water and liquid mud. The new grenade is required to be watertight."
The two problems encountered in hot, humid climates, such as Egypt (Alexandria) and Iraq were:
Poor sealing allowing ingress of moisture, which was readily absorbed by the hygroscopic ammonium nitrate of the ammonal/amatol/alumatol filling;
The use of low grade ammonal/amatol/alumatol in TW stores in general which caused exudation or spewing through the poor sealing.
The absorption of water could seriously degrade the explosive properties of the filling, while exudation of what was effectively an explosive oil was just downright dangerous. Depending on the storage conditions degradation could occur from days to weeks.
The M designation of stores sealed with special wax was of course a solution to the leakage/waterproofing problem.
Tom.
I've not encountered a documented storage life for Mills grenades, and no doubt it was envisaged that they would be used before any deterioration set in. There are, however, plenty of documents that mention problems with Mills grenades and Nos 23 MkIII and 36 grenades that have been condemned at the Front or in Lines of Communication for various reasons. As late as October 1918 there is a Trench Warfare committee minute concerning possible replacement for the No.36 that includes: "It is understood that there is a very considerable wastage with the present Service grenades (i.e. the No.36), particularly in winter time, as it is difficult to keep them from water and liquid mud. The new grenade is required to be watertight."
The two problems encountered in hot, humid climates, such as Egypt (Alexandria) and Iraq were:
Poor sealing allowing ingress of moisture, which was readily absorbed by the hygroscopic ammonium nitrate of the ammonal/amatol/alumatol filling;
The use of low grade ammonal/amatol/alumatol in TW stores in general which caused exudation or spewing through the poor sealing.
The absorption of water could seriously degrade the explosive properties of the filling, while exudation of what was effectively an explosive oil was just downright dangerous. Depending on the storage conditions degradation could occur from days to weeks.
The M designation of stores sealed with special wax was of course a solution to the leakage/waterproofing problem.
Tom.
